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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970107-CA 
v. : 
MARK STEPHEN MERILA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for absconding from parole supervision, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (1996). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction for 
absconding from parole supervision? "When a jury verdict is challenged on 
insufficiency grounds, [an appellate court] review[s] the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. [An appellate court will] reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); see also State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), 
cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did defendant preserve for appeal whether evidence he evaded arrest by 
parole officers was relevant? If so, did the trial court properly rule that such 
evidence was relevant to defendant's state of mind? Since defendant failed to 
preserve this issue, there is no basis for review. Assuming, arguendo, the issue was 
preserved, a trial court's decision to admit evidence is subject to review for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 
239-240. 
3. Was it plain error when the judge did not sua sponte give a limiting 
instruction on evidence defendant evaded arrest by parole officers? 
4. Was a statement by the prosecutor during closing argument unsupported 
by evidence? 
Because defendant failed to lodge a timely objection, the standard for review on 
issues 3. and 4. is the same. "[A]bsent a timely objection, [this Court] will review an 
alleged error . . . only if it constitutes 'plain error'." State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 
821 (Utah 1989). In State v. Reves. 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme 
Court reiterated a three-step test for plain error: 
2 
To establish plain error, a party must show the following: (1) an error 
exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) 
the error was harmful, or in other words, absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the complaining 
party. . . . The claim of plain error fails if any one of these requirements 
is not shown. 
Id at 1057 (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
5* Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective for not requesting a limiting 
instruction on the evading arrest evidence, and for not objecting to the 
prosecutor's closing argument? "[W]here the ineffective assistance claim is raised for 
the first time on direct appeal, [this Court] must decide whether defendant was deprived 
of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 
170, 175 (Utah App. 1992)." State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 
1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) and (4)(b)(iii) (1996): 
(2) An offender absconds from supervision when he willfully 
changes the residence that he reported as his correct address without 
notifying his parole officer or obtaining permission. . . . 
(4)(b) "Offender" means a person who has been convicted of a 
crime and has been: . . . 
(iii) placed on parole under condition that he report to 
a parole officer on a regular basis . . . . 
^ 
Rule 105, Utah R. Evid,: 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is 
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper 
scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
Rule 401, Utah R. Evid.: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, a Utah State Prison parolee, was charged with absconding from 
parole supervision, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
309.5(2) (1996) (R. 4). Before closing arguments, defendant moved to dismiss for 
insufficient evidence (R. 128: 64, 74-75).l The trial court summarily denied the 
motion, concluding that there was an issue of fact for the jury to resolve (R. 128: 75). 
The jury convicted defendant and he was sentenced to zero-to-five years in prison to be 
served consecutively with his original sentences (R. 68-69; 128: 91). Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 71-74, 77-82). 
1
 The cover page of the trial transcript is R. 128, but actual transcript pages 
retain their original numbering (i.e., 1-97). Therefore, pages from the trial transcript 
will be cited, e.g., as "R. 128: 1." Defendant uses this same convention. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Point I - Absconding from parole supervision 
On 26 December 1995 defendant was paroled after serving part of his prison 
sentence for burglary, escape from custody, and burglary of a dwelling (R. 128: 29; 
State's Exhibit 1). As one of the conditions of his parole, defendant agreed to 
"establish and reside at a residence of record" and "not change my residence without 
first obtaining permission from my parole agent" (State's Exhibit 2). 
After his release, defendant began living at his girlfriend's house (R. 128: 44, 
65). Defendant was required to wear an ankle bracelet for electronic monitoring. A 
unit installed at his girlfriend's house transmitted information to parole agents so they 
could monitor defendant's compliance with his 9:00 p.m. curfew (R. 128: 31). 
On 4 June 1996 the monitoring equipment revealed that defendant had not 
returned to the house until about 5:00 a.m. (R. 128: 31-32). Defendant's parole officer 
went to the house at about 7:30 a.m., but no one answered the door (R. 128: 32-33). 
Parole agents went to the house again several times that day to see if defendant was 
home, including at 10:30 p.m that night (R. 128: 37). But defendant was not there (R. 
128: 32-33). 
2
 The evidence and all reasonable inferences are recited in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) 
(citations omitted) 
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At about 7:00 a.m. on 5 June 1996 defendant left a voicemail message for his 
parole officer saying that he would be looking for another job (R. 128:33-35, 38). The 
parole officer returned defendant's call at 7:45 a.m., but defendant was not home. IcL 
Later that morning, agents went to the house, found that defendant was not there, and 
removed the monitoring unit because it was clear defendant had disabled or removed 
his ankle bracelet and it was no longer possible to monitor him (R. 128: 33, 36).3 
At about 9:45 p.m. that night, defendant's parole officer went to the house and 
searched for defendant. Although his clothes and belongings were there, defendant was 
not (R. 128: 33-34). The parole officer told defendant's girlfriend that defendant 
needed to get in touch with him to straighten things out because he was in violation of 
his parole (R. 128: 34, 69). 
Also that day, a parole agent responsible for tracking fugitives sent a letter to 
defendant's girlfriend explaining that the Board of Pardons had issued a warrant for 
defendant's arrest. The letter concluded, "If you have any information as to the 
whereabouts of this individual, please contact the nearest police or sheriffs office or 
contact this office" [the letter included two phone numbers] (State's Exhibit 3). 
3
 In footnote 2 of defendant's brief (Def. Br. at 7), he confuses the prior 
replacement of the monitoring unit (see R. 128: 36-37) with its removal after he had 
disabled or removed the ankle bracelet (see R. 128: 33, 39). Defendant concludes that 
"testimony concerning the electronic monitoring equipment does not support the 
determination that [defendant] changed his residence." (Def. Br. at 7, n.2). On the 
contrary, defendant's tampering with or removal of the ankle bracelet clearly suggests 
his intent to change his residence and avoid supervision. 
6 
Defendant's girlfriend received the letter, knew there was a warrant for defendant's 
arrest, and knew that she was supposed to report any information about his 
whereabouts. However, she never reported to authorities that defendant was still 
residing at her house (R. 128: 70-71). Defendant likewise never reported his 
whereabouts to authorities. 
Approximately a week later, defendant's girlfriend was talking on the phone 
about an unrelated matter with her uncle, who happens to be a parole officer (R. 128: 
44-45, 67, 72-73). Her uncle brought up the subject of defendant's disappearance, 
asked her if she knew where defendant was, and said that it would be in his best 
interest to turn himself in (R. 128: 72-73). Defendant's girlfriend responded by saying, 
"He's come and he's stayed here. He stays here but he doesn't come until later at night 
. . . . like at two o'clock in the morning [and] stay[s] for a couple of hours" (R. 128: 
45, 72-73). 
Points II, III, and V - Evading arrest by parole officers 
A couple of weeks after this telephone conversation, Agent Vankatwyk, the 
girlfriend's uncle, received a tip from an informant that defendant would be at his 
girlfriend's workplace the following day, 24 June 1996 (R. 128: 41). Vankatwyk 
relayed this information to defendant's parole officer (R. 128: 41). Parole agents set 
up surveillance (R. 128: 42). At approximately 5:00 p.m., defendant drove by in his 
girlfriend's car and continued down the street where he pulled into a gas station (R. 
7 
128: 42, 43, 46, 51). Agents followed in their cars and tried to pull in front and behind 
defendant's car to block it in. IcL Vankatwyk, driving a third car, pulled up driver's-
side-to-driver's-side with defendant (R. 128: 43, 46-47). Defendant knew Vankatwyk 
and would have seen him, since they were facing each other. IcL Another agent, 
wearing field gear with a star on the shirt imprinted with identification, got out of the 
car Vankatwyk was driving, stood a few feet from defendant, pointed her weapon at 
him, and ordered him out of the car (R. 128: 43, 60). 
Defendant drove off (R. 128: 43). Agents pursued, turning on red and blue 
flashing police lights in their unmarked cars (R. 128: 52-54). Defendant responded by 
going faster, driving on the sidewalk, and running a red light. kL After driving into 
the backyard of a house, defendant abandoned the car when it high-centered on the base 
of a portable basketball standard (R. 128: 63). Defendant then ran down a riverbank 
and began to swim across the Jordan River (R. 128: 54-55). 
One of the agents arrived at the riverbank and ordered defendant to come back, 
but defendant failed to respond and continued swimming across (R. 128: 56). An agent 
also swam across the river, found defendant standing behind a tree and some brush, and 
ordered him to come out. Instead of complying, defendant went behind a house. The 
agent followed and found defendant hiding, slumped down, against the back of a tool 
shed. The agent arrested and handcuffed defendant (R. 128: 56-57, 62). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The evidence was sufficient to establish that, to avoid parole 
supervision, defendant changed his residence without notifying his parole agent or 
obtaining permission. After violating his curfew, defendant failed to return to his 
reported residence at times officers would reasonably be expected to seek him out, and 
his whereabouts were unknown to authorities until his arrest three weeks later. The 
jury obviously rejected his girlfriend's testimony that defendant simply continued living 
in the residence. Credibility determinations are left to the trier of fact. 
Point II. Defendant did not object to the evidence he now challenges, and has 
claimed neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances. He has therefore failed to 
provide a basis for review. Even if this Court finds the issue was preserved, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant evaded arrest by 
parole officers. In order to establish defendant's guilt for absconding from parole 
supervision, the State was required to prove that defendant acted willfully or 
intentionally. Evidence that defendant evaded arrest by parole officers was highly 
probative of his intent to avoid parole supervision. 
Point III. Defendant did not ask for a limiting instruction on the evading arrest 
evidence. During his closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that the evidence 
was relevant to defendant's state of mind, and never suggested that the jury should 
9 
consider it as evidence of defendant's criminal propensity. Therefore, it was not plain 
error for the trial court not to give a sua sponte limiting instruction. 
Point IV. The now-challenged statement by the prosecutor in closing argument 
was based on a permissible inference from evidence properly before the jury and was 
not plain error. 
Point V. Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective when he did not request a 
limiting instruction (see Point III) or object to the prosecutor's closing argument (see 
Point IV). The evidence in his case provided no basis for a limiting instruction, and 
there was no basis to object to the prosecutor's closing argument since it was supported 
by the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT FOR ABSCONDING FROM PAROLE 
SUPERVISION 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he changed 
his residence in violation of the absconding statute (Def. Br. at 11-14, 18-19). 
Defendant also argues that, since it otherwise provides for revocation of parole when a 
parolee violates conditions of parole, the legislature did not intend to punish such 
violations under the absconding statute (Def. Br. at 14-18). 
10 
Defendant's sufficiency argument ignores the meaning of "willfully changes the 
residence" in the context of the absconding statute, and relies on his girlfriend's 
testimony which was rejected by the jury. Defendant's double jeopardy argument fails, 
since revocation of parole is not punishment but reinstatement of an already-adjudged 
sentence, and the existence of the absconding statute itself establishes the legislature's 
intent to punish as crimes the acts its prohibits. 
A. "Willfully changes the residence" in context 
Defendant was convicted of "absconding from supervision": 
(2) An offender absconds from supervision when he willfully 
changes the residence that he reported as his correct address without 
notifying his parole officer or obtaining permission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (1996).4 
Defendant asserts that the plain meaning of "willfully changes the residence" is 
"to replace the reported residence with another residence where one actually lives with 
an intent to remain" (Def. Br. at 14). Thus, to prove his guilt defendant would 
apparently require the State to establish that, without giving notice or getting 
permission, he had moved someplace else, actually lived there, and intended to remain. 
But this strained construction ignores the meaning of "willfully changes the residence" 
4
 The effective date of the absconding statute was 29 April 1996, see Annotation, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5 (1997), approximately one month before defendant 
began to evade his parole officer. There is, as yet, no reported Utah case dealing with 
this statute. 
11 
in the context of the statute. See GEICO v. Dennis. 645 P.2d 672, 674 n. 1 (Utah 
1982) ("Although the term is frequently found in statutes, contracts, and other 
documents, ['resident' or 'residence'] has no precise, technical, and fixed definition 
applicable in all contexts and to all cases" (case citations omitted)); see also King v. St. 
Vincents Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 570 (1991) (statute is to be read as a whole, because 
statutory language, plain or not, depends on the context); Moreno v. Board of Educ. of 
Jordan Sch. Dist.. 926 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1996) ("'One of the cardinal principles of 
statutory construction is that the courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the 
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing 
with the subject/" (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pavne. 782 P.2d 464, 
466 (Utah 1989))). 
"Residence" appears in the absconding statute in the context of parole 
supervision. The modifying phrase, "residence reported as his correct address," refers 
to a specific address a parolee has identified to authorities as the location subject to 
their supervision. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (1997) (emphasis added). 
As with other convicted felons on parole, defendant's reported residence was 
critical to his supervision for at least three important reasons: as a condition of parole, 
defendant agreed (1) to "permit visits to my place of residence by agents of Adult 
Probation and Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of my 
12 
parole" (State's Exhibit 2, paragraph 4, emphasis added);5 (2) to "permit agents of 
Adult Probation and Parole to search my person, residence, vehicle, or any other 
property under my control without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon 
reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the conditions of my parole" (Id., 
paragraph 5; emphasis added); and (3) to be subject to electronic monitoring and have a 
unit installed at his reported residence to track whether he was complying with his 
curfew (State's Exhibit 2, paragraph 11; R. 128: 30-31). 
Thus, contrary to defendant's construction, the essence of the absconding offense 
is not proof of a defendant's presence at a new residence with the intent to remain,6 but 
proof that, to avoid parole supervision, he was intentionally absent from the residence 
he reported to authorities. See State v. Graham. 284 N.J.Super. 413, 416, 665 A.2d 
769, 771 (N. J.Super. A.D. 1995), (in order to convict a parolee of absconding from 
supervision, "the State would have to show that after leaving an approved residence, 
the parolee somehow attempted to avoid parole supervision or apprehension, such as by 
residing at a location that was unknown to parole officials and failing to communicate 
5
 Defendant's parole officer was required to visit defendant at least twice a 
month (R. 128: 30). 
6
 This is akin to the standard for determining "domicile" for tax liability. See 
Lassche v. State Tax Comm'n.. 866 P.2d 618 (Utah App. 1993); Rule R865-9-2I(D), 
Utah Code of Administrative Procedure. 
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with them"), cert, denied. 144 N.J. 378, 676 A.2d 1092 (N.J. 1995).7 
In sum, when "the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the 
entire context and subject matter of the statute" are properly considered, the absconding 
statute manifestly applies to defendant's specific conduct of intentionally absenting 
himself from his reported residence, and he was properly convicted under its terms. 
See Moreno. 926 P.2d at 889. 
B. Sufficient evidence 
The evidence is sufficient to establish that defendant absconded from parole 
supervision on or about 3 June 1996 by willfully changing his residence without notice 
or permission. 
Defendant failed to return to his reported residence by his 9:00 p.m. curfew on 
3 June 1996 (R. 128: 31). When his parole officer went to the house early the next 
morning, 4 June 1996, no one came to the door (R. 128: 32-33). When agents went to 
the house several times later that day, including at 10:30 p.m., defendant was not there 
(R. 128: 37). Defendant did not respond to his parole officer's telephone call, and he 
was not at the house when agents looked for him several times, including after 
7
 In determining the meaning of "willfully changing residence" in the parole 
context, the Court could profitably adopt factors relating to "residence" from an 
insurance context: "the individual's physical presence or absence from the household, 
the relationship of the individual to the [owner], the circumstances surrounding the 
person's presence or absence from the [owner']s home, prior living arrangements of the 
individual, and the individual's intentions at various times regarding his place of 
residence." GEICO v. Dennis. 645 P.2d 672, 676 n.2 (Utah 1982). 
14 
10:00 p.m., on 5 June 1996 (R. 128: 33-34, 36). Defendant failed to notify his parole 
agent of his whereabouts, and his location was unknown to authorities until his arrest 
on 24 June 1996 (R. 128: 41-43, 46, 51, 56-57, 62). These facts are sufficient to 
establish that defendant willfully changed his residence without notice or permission to 
avoid parole supervision (see also Point II B., below). 
C. Credibility issues left to the trier of fact 
In addition to reliance on a strained reading of the statute, defendant's 
insufficiency argument rests on the credibility of his girlfriend's testimony (Def. Br. at 
18-19). As a witness for the defense, she testified on direct that defendant never moved 
out of her residence, never indicated that he was going to move somewhere else, and 
was still living with her between 4 June and his arrest on 24 June 1996 (R. 128: 66). 
From their verdict it is clear the jury rejected this testimony. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held: 
When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as 
the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 
be given particular evidence. State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 
1980); State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Logan. 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977); State v. Harless. 23 Utah 2d 128, 
459 P.2d 210, 211 (Utah 1969). Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not 
reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in 
the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. Logan. 563 P.2d at 813-814. 
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State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). Exceptions to this rule (see kL) 
are inapplicable here. Therefore, this Court must defer to the jury's credibility 
determination. 
In finding defendant guilty, the jury was justified in rejecting his girlfriend's 
testimony on at least four grounds. First, the jurors were able to observe her 
demeanor. See In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996) ("Long history has taught the 
judiciary that the forum which hears conflicting evidence has a superior capability to 
resolve factual questions, particularly where witness demeanor is concerned." (citing 
State v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). Second, her failure to notify law 
enforcement authorities about defendant's whereabouts after their specific requests, 
including a written request with notice of a warrant for his arrest, undermined her 
testimony that defendant simply continued to live with her and suggested her collusion 
in helping him avoid authorities (see R. 128: 34, 68-70; State's Exhibit 3). Third, her 
status as defendant's girlfriend (and as his "fiance" at the time of trial, R. 128: 65) 
suggested clear bias and a motive to misrepresent (see Utah R. Evid. 608(c)). Finally, 
the testimony upon which defendant relies (see Def. Br. at 8, 18-19) was undermined 
by a prior inconsistent statement (see Utah R. Evid. 613, 801(d)(1)). His girlfriend's 
uncle testified that he had brought up the subject of defendant's disappearance a week 
after his departure, asked her if she knew where he was, and told her it would be in 
defendant's best interest to turn himself in (R. 128: 72-73). She responded that he had 
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stayed at her house, visiting late at night for a couple of hours (R. 128: 45, 72-73; cf 
R. 128: 70). This prior statement was in conflict with the girlfriend's testimony that 
defendant simply continued to live at her home (see R. 128: 66).8 
In sum, the trial court was justified in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for 
lack of evidence since there was an issue of fact for the jury to resolve (R. 128: 75). 
The jury clearly resolved that issue against defendant by rejecting the direct testimony 
of his sole witness. This Court must defer to that credibility determination. See 
Workman. 852 P.2d at 984. Defendant's insufficiency claim likewise fails on appeal. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence was not so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 235. 
D. No double jeopardy 
Defendant argues in the alternative that, since it otherwise provides for 
revocation of parole when a parolee violates conditions of parole, the legislature did not 
8
 Even if jurors believed defendant had frequent late-night visits with his 
girlfriend and left belongings at her house, they were still justified in concluding that it 
was no longer his "residence/1 See Haddow v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 672-674 (Utah 
1985) (spending "considerable time" at lover's house and leaving "portable possessions 
. . . such as clothes, toiletries, furniture, and photo albums" not alone determinative of 
"residence" under cohabitation provision of divorce decree); State v. Gurr. 904 P.2d 
238 (Utah App. 1995) ("spending some nights at his girlfriend's" and moving "some of 
his things into her apartment" not sufficient to establish defendant's "primary 
residence" for purposes of executing search warrant). 
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intend to punish such violations under the absconding statute (Def. Br. at 14-18). 
Defendant's argument has been explicitly rejected by this Court: "We conclude 
that criminal conduct committed while on parole can support a revocation of parole as 
well as punishment for new crime without violating double jeopardy." State v. 
McGuire. 924 P.2d 904, 907 (Utah App), cert, granted, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
Revocation of parole is not punishment, but simply reinstatement of an adjudged 
sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202 (1997) provides that 
any person who violates the terms of his parole, while serving parole, 
shall at the discretion of the Board of Pardons and Parole be recommitted 
to prison to serve the portion of the balance of his term as determined by 
the Board of Pardons and Parole, but not to exceed the maximum term. 
(Emphasis added; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(1) (1997) (violations of parole 
conditions may result in revocation of parole). 
Finally, the existence of the absconding statute itself establishes the legislature's 
intent to punish separately as a crime the acts it prohibits. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
309.5 (1997). 
Point II 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR 
APPEAL; IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY RULED THAT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT 
EVADED ARREST BY PAROLE OFFICERS WAS RELEVANT 
Defendant argues that evidence that he fled from parole officers on 24 June 1996 
was irrelevant, and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it (Def. Br. at 
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20-24). However, defendant did not object to the evidence he now challenges. Since 
he has claimed neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances, defendant has failed 
to establish a basis for this Court's review. In any event, evidence defendant fled from 
parole officers who were trying to arrest him was highly probative of his intent to avoid 
parole supervision. 
A. Issue not preserved 
Defendant argues that his objection at trial preserved this issue (Def. Br. at 3, 
citing R. 128: 50). Read in context, defendant's objection related not to any testimony 
about his evasion of arrest or eventual capture, but to testimony regarding his 
girlfriend's actions during the parole officers' surveillance. The following summary 
and excerpts from the record put defendant's objection in context. 
During opening statement, the prosecutor spent what now comprises two pages 
of trial transcript discussing the evidence the State would present that defendant fled 
from parole officers who were trying to arrest him (R. 128: 23-25). Defendant did not 
object. 
A parole officer testified in the State's case-in-chief about the surveillance, 
attempted arrest of defendant, defendant's flight, the officers' pursuit, and defendant's 
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eventual arrest, all without defense objection (R. 128: 40-43).9 
The next witness, another parole officer, also began testifying about the 
surveillance: 
Q. Now, as you sat in the parking lot, what was the first thing that 
you noticed that drew your attention? 
A. We saw Ms. Johnson [defendant's girlfriend] come out of the business. 
Q. And after she came out -
MR. JAENISH [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, if I may, I'm not 
sure what the relevance of this testimony is with respect to the charges 
before the Court. He's charged with absconding by changing his 
residence. I'm not sure where this is going in terms of relevance. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to respond? 
MR. SHEPHERD [Prosecutor]: Yes, your Honor. I think it 
relates to the defendant's state of mind. 
THE COURT: Objection's overruled. You may continue. 
(R. 128: 50). The witness continued to testify briefly about the girlfriend's actions, and 
then in detail about defendant's approach in a car, the attempted arrest, the pursuit, and 
9
 In footnote 5 of his brief (Def. Br. at 20), defendant concedes that he did not 
object to this testimony, but "maintains counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
the admissibility of that evidence. See Points II.A. and D., and IV, infra." A review 
of the cited portions of defendant's brief disclose no further argument on this issue. It 
is the State's position that this footnoted assertion, without further argument, is 
insufficient to preserve ineffectiveness as a basis for this Court's review. See rule 
24(a)(9) and (h); State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145 (Utah App. 1997) (when an appellee 
fails to comply with rule 24(a)(9), this Court will decline to address the issue because 
the "'reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump 
the burden of argument and research'") (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988) (citation omitted); accord Burns v. Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) ("'This court has routinely declined to consider arguments which are 
not adequately briefed on appeal'" (quoting State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992))). 
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defendant's eventual arrest, all without further objection (R. 128: 50-57). 
As this Court recently held, "'[A] contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal/ Importantly, the grounds 
for objection must be distinctly and specifically stated." State v. Winward. 941 P.2d 
627, 633 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 
1989) (quoting State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987))); see also Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a)(1). In context, defendant objected to the relevance of testimony about his 
girlfriend's activities during surveillance. Since defendant did not distinctly nor 
specifically object to the evidence he now challenges, he has failed to preserve this 
issue for appellate review. 
Absent a specific objection at trial, a defendant must assert plain error or 
exceptional circumstances to warrant review. See State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7-8, 12 
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). Because defendant has asserted 
neither, he has failed to provide a basis for this Court's review. Id. 
B. Evading arrest by parole officers relevant 
If this Court finds there is a basis for review, the trial court properly ruled, in 
any event, that evidence defendant fled when confronted by parole officers was 
relevant. 
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It is well settled under Utah case law that "evidence of flight is probative." State 
v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34, 39 (Utah 1987) (citing State v. Simpson. 120 Utah 596, 236 
P.2d 1077 (1951) and State v. Marasco. 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933)); State v. 
Bales. 675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983) ("our cases affirm the admissibility of evidence 
of flight"). The cases caution, however, that an inference of intent or consciousness of 
guilt cannot be supported by flight evidence alone. See State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 
790 (Utah 1991) (flight, without other evidence, insufficient to support an inference of 
intent), rev'd. on different grounds. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991); State v. Crawford. 59 
Utah 39, 45, 201 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1921) (conviction reversed where only evidence 
connecting defendant with burglary was his attempt to escape from custody). 
But flight is not the only evidence of defendant's intent or guilt. As already 
discussed, his departure from his reported residence, absence when officers repeatedly 
searched for him the following two days, and failure to report his whereabouts to his 
parole officer over a three-week period are sufficient evidence to establish his guilt (see 
Point I, above). 
Nevertheless, evidence he fled when confronted by parole officers was highly 
probative of defendant's intent. To find defendant guilty, the jury had to find as an 
essential element of the offense that he "acted willfully or intentionally" (R. at 55; Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (1996)). Evidence offered to prove an element of the 
charged offense can hardly be considered irrelevant. See Utah R. Evid. 401 and 
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404(b).10 Ct Graham, 284 NJ.Super. at 416, 665 A.2d at 771 (in order to convict a 
parolee of absconding from supervision, State required to show that, after leaving an 
approved residence, the parolee attempted to avoid parole supervision or apprehension). 
Indeed, defendant's actions in evading arrest by parole officers went to the very essence 
of his continuing offense: an effort to remain free from their control.11 
Although defendant's crime was arguably complete the day he left his reported 
residence with the intent to avoid supervision, his offense continued as long as his 
absence from his reported residence left him free of supervision. See United States v. 
Bailey. 100 S. Ct. 624 (1980) (it is "clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal 
custody as defined in 751(a) is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held 
liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure"); State v. 
Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) (burglary complete upon entry, but a "continuing 
offense" in felony murder context), cert, denied. 114 S. Ct. 706 (1994). Therefore, as 
the prosecutor argued, evidence of defendant's flight when confronted by officers was 
10
 Defendant has objected to this evidence solely on relevance grounds. He did 
not cite Utah R. Evid. 403 nor 404(b) below, nor has he cited either rule in his brief on 
appeal. Any challenge to its admissibility under these rules is therefore waived. See 
Winward. 941 P.2d at 633; Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). 
11
 Common sense is sufficient to rebut defendant's assertion that the State 
presented no evidence in his case connecting the flight evidence with the absconding 
offense (Def. Br. at 23 n.6). See United States v. Clark. 45 F.3d 1247, 1250 (8th Cir. 
1995) (presumption of consciousness of guilt and therefore guilt rationally connected to 
proof of accused's flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, and related conduct 
because "reason and common sense justify these well-established inferences"). 
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"useful in determining what his state of mind was throughout this entire period of time" 
(R. 128: 80). Specifically, defendant's strenuous efforts to evade arrest were highly 
probative of his continuing intent to be free from parole supervision. 
For this reason, defendant's case differs from the cases he has cited in support of 
his argument where a defendant fled from the scene of a crime or escaped from police 
custody (Def. Br. at 21-24; citing State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987) (murder 
suspect fled from police during questioning); State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983) 
(burglary suspect fled when approached by police at the scene of the crime); State v. 
Crawford. 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030 (Utah 1921) (burglar escaped from police custody 
after arrest)). Defendant was not a potentially innocent suspect fleeing from custody or 
the scene of a crime, and there was no ambiguity or potentially innocent explanation for 
his actions. Defendant was an already-convicted felon on parole whose evasion of 
arrest by parole officers was specific evidence on one of the elements of his charged 
offense. Defendant was not seen fleeing the scene of a crime. Defendant was 
approached in a parked car by an arresting parole officer with gun drawn. Instead of 
surrendering, he fled (R. 128: 43, 60). 
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Defendant's case is therefore similar to the facts in State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573 
(Utah 1983), where the evidence of flight was "undisputed,"12 and the defendants fled 
"immediately after a police officer identified himself and ordered them to stop." Bales. 
675 p.2d at 575 (cf R. 128: 43, 60). As defendant conceded in his brief, under these 
circumstances the Utah Supreme Court "reiterated that 'flight' evidence was relevant 
and admissible" (Def. Br. at 23, quoting Bales. 675 P.2d at 575). 
In sum, even if this issue was preserved, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it ruled that evidence defendant fled from parole officers was relevant. 
See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938; Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 239-240. 
Point III13 
IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT NOT TO 
GIVE A SUA SPONTE LIMITING INSTRUCTION ABOUT 
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT EVADED ARREST BY PAROLE 
OFFICERS 
Defendant argues that it was plain error for the judge not to sua sponte give a 
limiting instruction regarding evidence that he fled from parole officers (Def. Br. at 24-
31). Defendant's argument fails under the applicable rule of evidence and pertinent 
case law. 
12
 Defendant argues that the evidence of his flight was "disputed" because he 
contested its relevance at trial (Def. Br. at 24). This argument was addressed in II.A., 
above. Testimony defendant fled from parole officers (see R. 128: 43, 60) was 
undisputed since defendant chose not to testify. 
13
 The State has made defendant's Point II.B. through D. a separate point. 
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Rule 105, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides for a limiting instruction, upon 
request, when evidence admissible for one purpose is not admissible for another 
purpose. Since defendant did not request such an instruction, the trial court was not 
required to give one sua sponte. 
This reading of rule 105 finds ample support in Utah case law. See State v. 
Rocco, 795 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1990) (no error forjudge not to give limiting 
instruction sua sponte; defendant must request instruction or waives any right to 
complain); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) (no plain error to fail to 
give limiting instruction on use of other crimes evidence when no request made); State 
v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) (where evidence of prior act is admitted to prove 
intent, and defendant requests a limiting instruction, trial court should so instruct the 
jury, but failure to do so was not prejudicial error); State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 
432 P.2d 53 (Utah 1967) (defendant entitled to an instruction limiting jury's 
consideration of prior crime evidence to defendant's motive for committing the charged 
offense, but only if defendant requested the instruction; failure to request constituted 
waiver). Thus, under applicable case law, a trial court had no duty to give a limiting 
instruction sua sponte. 
Defendant relies on footnoted dicta from this Court's opinion in a civil case: "it 
appears that, at least in criminal cases, evidence of flight is circumspectly admitted and, 
if admitted, must be accompanied by specific instructions" (See Def. Br. at 25 and 27 
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(quoting Fisher v. Trapp. 748 P.2d 204, 205 n.l (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1278 (Utah 1988)). Dicta from a civil case is not controlling here. See State v. 
Pappas. 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1985) (dicta cited by defendant not controlling). Further, 
Fisher, decided by this Court in 1988, predates the Utah Supreme Court's 1990 
decision in Rocco which holds that a defendant must request a limiting instruction or 
the issue is waived. Rocco. 795 P.2d at 1119 (citing Valdez. 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 
P.2d 53 (Utah 1967)). But most importantly, even if defendant had requested a limiting 
instruction, the facts in his case provided no basis to give one (see Point V, below). 
In sum, since the applicable law is contrary to his position, defendant's plain 
error argument fails. Reyes. 861 P.2d at 1055 (plain error claim fails if no error 
exists). 
Point IV 
THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS 
NOT PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant argues that it was plain error for the prosecutor to make the following 
statement in closing argument because it was unsupported by any evidence (Def. Br. at 
10-11,31-34): 
I would also suggest to you that from the facts as we know them, 
that if Adult Probation and Parole had gone out at almost any reasonable 
hour [during the relevant period] looking for him there [at his girlfriend's 
house], they wouldn't have found him because he wouldn't have been 
there. 
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(R. 128: 88). Defendant also argues that, absent this statement, there was a reasonable 
likelihood he would have been acquitted (Def. Br. at 34-37). 
Defendant's plain error argument fails because the prosecutor's argument was 
supported by the testimony of three witnesses, including defendant's own witness. 
Defendant's parole officer testified that when parole officers went to the house several 
times looking for defendant, from early in the morning until late at night on 
4 June 1996, defendant was not there (R. 128: 37). He also testified that when parole 
officers went to the house several times on 5 June 1996, again, from early in the 
morning until after defendant's curfew, defendant was not there (R. 128: 33-34, 36).14 
In addition, defendant's girlfriend told her uncle that, during the following week, 
defendant came to her house in the middle of the night, around 2:00 a.m., but only 
stayed for a couple of hours (R. 128: 45, 72-73). Finally, on cross-examination, 
defendant's girlfriend testified that defendant was in and out and she did not know 
where he was at times (R. 128: 70). 
It is well settled that during closing argument a prosecutor may draw permissible 
inferences and deductions from the evidence. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 
(Utah 1989); State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988); State v. Valdez. 30 
Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973); State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900 (Utah 
14
 Given his parole officer's testimony, defendant's assertion that "the prosecutor 
in this case presented evidence that officers went to [his] residence on only one 
occasion" (Def. Br. at 34; emphasis added) is itself clearly erroneous. 
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App.), cert, granted. 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995), vacated on other grounds, 925 P.2d 
937 (Utah 1996). Therefore, based on testimony that parole officers had not found 
defendant at his girlfriend's home during reasonable times and that defendant spent only 
a couple of hours at her house in the middle of the night, the prosecutor's statement 
was not error, let alone plain error. 
Where there is no error, there is no need to assess for prejudice. Reyes. 861 
P.2d at 1055 (plain error claim fails if no error exists). Nevertheless, one point of 
defendant's prejudice argument merits comment. Defendant argues that the trial court 
failed to instruct the jury that "arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence and that 
(jury members] are to rely only on the evidence in reaching factual conclusions" (Def. 
Br. at 36 (citations omitted)). While the trial court did not give this instruction at the 
close of the trial, it gave such an instruction at the very beginning (see R. 128: 19). 
Moreover, at the outset of his closing argument, the prosecutor said, "as the Court has 
reminded you, I remind you again what I say is not evidence in the case, but rather the 
evidence is the testimony that you've heard from the witnesses on the stand and those 
documents that have been admitted into evidence" (R. 128: 76-77; ct Rocco, 795 P.2d 
at 1118 (even though evidence about a burglary mentioned by the prosecutor in his 
opening statement was never offered, the prosecutor's statement about the burglary was 
harmless in part because he told the jury at the outset that what he and defense counsel 
said in their opening statements was not evidence)). 
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Point V 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE 
WHEN HE DID NOT REQUEST A LIMITING INSTRUCTION OR 
OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
In the alternative to his plain error arguments under Point III and IV above, 
defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not request a 
limiting instruction for the evading arrest evidence, and because he did not object 
during the prosecutor's closing argument (Def. Br. at 37-41). 
Since the evidence provided no basis for a limiting instruction in defendant's 
case, it was not deficient performance for his trial counsel not to ask for one. In 
addition, since the now-challenged statement by the prosecutor during closing argument 
was supported by the evidence and was not error, there was no basis for trial counsel to 
object. 
A. No basis for limiting instruction 
Defendant argues that "flight" evidence should not have been admitted without 
an instruction to the jury that "(1) there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with 
innocence, and (2) even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not 
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged" (Def Br. at 38, quoting State v. 
Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 n.l (Utah App. 1988)). While this may be true where a 
suspect simply flees from the scene of a crime, it is not true under the facts and 
circumstances of defendant's case (see n.4, above). 
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Defendant, a parolee who had had no contact with parole officers for three 
weeks, was approached in his parked car by a parole officer with gun drawn (R. 128: 
43, 60). Defendant had not been seen fleeing the scene of a crime — he drove away 
after the parole officer order him to get out of the car (R. 128: 43). He sped up when 
pursuing officers turned on their vehicles' red and blue flashing lights (R. 128: 52-54). 
Defendant then drove on the sidewalk, ran a red light, and abandoned the car after it 
high-centered in the backyard of a stranger's house (R. 128: 52-54, 63). Finally, 
defendant swam across a river, and tried to hide from a pursuing officer behind bushes 
and then a tool shed (R. 128: 56-57, 62). All told, defendant ignored three separate 
orders to surrender (R. 128:43, 56, 57). 
Defendant has cited no evidence suggesting a possible reason for his actions that 
is "fully consistent with innocence," and there is no such evidence. Therefore, there 
was no basis for a jury instruction in his case that "there may be reasons for flight fully 
consistent with innocence." State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34, 39 (Utah 1987) (must be 
evidence to support giving a flight instruction); accord Howland. 761 P.2d at 580; see 
also State v. Hines. - A.2d - (1998 WL 86584) (Conn. 1998) (no limiting instruction 
required where defendant did not testify or produce evidence supporting innocent 
explanation for his flight since such an instruction would be unsupported by the 
evidence); Wright v. State. 586 So.2d 1024, 1030 (Fla.1991) (flight instruction may be 
given only when supported by the evidence). 
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In addition, defendant's evasion of arrest necessarily reflected his actual guilt for 
absconding from parole supervision because it established the essential mens rea 
element of his crime. If there were any question whether defendant's absence from his 
reported residence was the result of ignorance, negligence, or even some simple 
misunderstanding, defendant's actions in evading arrest by parole officers removed any 
reasonable doubt. See Graham. 284 N.J. Super, at 416, 665 A.2d at 771 (in order to 
convict for absconding from parole, State required to show that, after leaving an 
approved residence, the parolee attempted to avoid parole supervision or apprehension). 
Therefore, since defendant's flight was evidence on the specific mens rea element of 
the charged offense, there was no basis for a jury instruction in his case that "even if 
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt 
of the crime charged." See Roberts v. State. 866 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. App. 1993) 
(limiting instruction regarding flight evidence not required "where testimony was 
admissible to prove a main fact in the case"). 
Since there was no basis for requesting a limiting instruction in his case, trial 
counsel's failure to request such an instruction was not deficient performance. See 
State v. Montes. 804 P.2d 543, n.l (Utah App. 1991) (where there is no basis for 
requesting a limiting instruction, counsel not ineffective for failing to request one) 
(citations omitted). 
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B. No basis for objection 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a 
prosecutor's statement during closing argument since it misrepresented the evidence 
(Def. Br. at 39-41). As discussed under Point IV above, defendant's argument is 
without merit since the prosecutor's statement was supported by the evidence. 
Since there was no basis to object, trial counsel's failure to object was not deficient 
performance. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
Because this case involves, for the first time, this Court's construction of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (1996), the State requests that it be set for oral argument or 
that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this fet day of April, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
(-BARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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